

Conceptual Roadblocks to an Understanding of Spiritual Reality in the Western Philosophical Tradition

Summary

At least since Socrates and his teachings on the immortality of the soul, the notion that the human spirit transcends the world of matter has been the majority opinion in the western philosophical tradition. However, basic assumptions about the nature of reality have created considerable obstacles to any conceptual elaboration. In predominant theories, the spirit or soul apart from the physical body ends up being not much more than an abstract point of consciousness.

The present paper is not meant to support (or oppose) the claim about the immortality of the soul and the reality of spirit world. It rather suggests that if the claim is to be maintained, certain conclusions are inevitable. It does so by applying the Unification Thought notions of *sungsang* and *hyungsang* to the analysis of some of the recurrent conceptual problems that have accompanied the spirit-body discussion.

Claude Perrottet

Secretary-general, Research Institute for the Integration of World Thought
Bridgeport, Connecticut, USA
Adjunct professor, International College and School of Continuing and Professional
Studies, University of Bridgeport

1. Spirit World in the Western Philosophical Tradition

The reality of Spirit world has been described and discussed from the perspective of Unification Thought in several papers presented at an earlier UTI Symposium.¹ My purpose today is rather to attempt a philosophical analysis of this issue. The present paper is not meant to support (or oppose) the claim about the immortality of the soul and the reality of spirit world. It rather suggests that if the claim is to be maintained without leading to serious contradictions certain conclusions are inevitable. It will do so by applying the Unification Thought notions of *sungsang* and *hyungsang* to the analysis of some of the recurrent conceptual problems that have accompanied the spirit-body discussion.

In an earlier article², I have already attempted to highlight the roadblocks that have largely prevented a theoretical consideration of the world of spirit in the past. Indeed, unlike the question of God's existence, which has been widely and hotly disputed throughout the history of philosophy, the question of the possible existence of a spirit world, i.e., a world of non-material, non-physical reality that cannot be perceived by our normal (physical) senses, has been generally dismissed.

The question of God is about the ultimate origin and meaning of existence. It is thus unavoidable in the quest for fundamental knowledge and thus a natural component of the philosophical enterprise. The question of spirit world, on the other hand, is about a possible dimension of reality that escapes our sense perception and about which there is only fragmentary and questionable information. Nevertheless, the world of spirit, transcending time and space as we know it in this world, is the (possible) final destination of human beings, and thus of very personal interest to each of us. As a result, the question of the immortality of the soul has been central to the idealist tradition since Antiquity, even before the issue of God became central to medieval Christian philosophy and theology.

We thus have a paradoxical situation where the issue of the immortality of the human mind or spirit is a classic philosophical topic, but the question about the nature of that spiritual existence has barely been touched upon. In fact, historically, a great majority of Western philosophers have expressed some form of a belief that the human spirit transcends the material realm, but what they had to say about it can often be summarized in the rather abstract notion of a simple point of consciousness. This applies in particular to the historical starting point: the Socratic-Platonic notion of the soul.

Plato

Plato, the believer in the world of ideas and the immortality of the soul, also believed that continued existence of the soul apart from the (physical) body was just that: bodiless. This is because by definition, the soul cannot have the qualities of the body: extension, which means divisibility, etc. For Plato, the soul has no parts. If it did, some parts would have qualities that other parts might not have, but the whole soul, as one, is “I.” Hence, the soul cannot have a body, which is composed of parts in time and space.

This has been referred to as the simplicity argument.³ The essential nature of the soul consists in its power of thinking; thought, being immaterial, is unextended, i.e., simple (having no parts); and what is simple is (a) indestructible; (b) a unity; and (c) an identity.⁴ In other words, corporeality, as we know it from our experience in our physical environment, is fundamentally incompatible with the very notion of a soul or spirit. Another type of corporeality, belonging to another dimension obeying an entirely different set of rules, is not considered.

The problem is that by reducing the soul (spirit) to a unitary point of consciousness deprived of any bodily existence, one also reduces it to something unreal—no matter how much its importance is stressed in lofty language. If there is a spirit besides and/or beyond the physical body, it cannot be conceived of apart from something that is more than mere consciousness or idea. In Unification terminology, an Individual Embodiment of Truth (any individual being) by necessity involves a *sungsang* (internal) aspect and a *hyungsang* (external, visible, bodily) aspect. Otherwise it remains an abstraction.

Augustine

Augustine, who lived close in time to the spiritual source of the Christian faith, offers a rather refreshing exception in several ways. As a Christian and a Platonist, he believed in the immortality of the soul. Contrary to some, like Tertullian, who believed that the soul consisted in minute material elements, he insists on the immaterial nature of the soul.⁵ He did, however, deal with the possibility that the soul of a disembodied spirit (including angels) might have some sort of a non-material body.

In chapter 25 of his *Treatise on the Soul and its Origin*, Augustine states that “the disembodied soul may think of itself under a bodily form.” But he quickly adds that beyond question that bodily form is spiritual, not corporeal.⁶ The term “corporeal,” which plainly means bodily, can be misleading. Strictly speaking, it can refer to any entity that has a distinct form or shape and real substance, be it material (physical) or other (spiritual). In fact, though, it is clear that, for Augustine, “spiritual, not corporeal” means that we are dealing with a pseudo-bodily appearance, which he also related to ghosts and dreams.

In Chapter 35 (referring to the bodies of angels), he writes: “If you would rather persist in your opinion that it is corporeal, you must first of all define what ‘body’ means;

lest, peradventure, it may turn out that we are agreed about the thing itself, but laboring to no purpose about its name. The absurd conclusions, however, to which you would be reduced if you thought of such a body in the soul, as are those substances which are called 'bodies' by all learned men,--I mean such as occupy portions of space, smaller ones for their smaller parts, and larger ones for their larger,--by means of the different relations of length and breadth and thickness, I venture to think you are by this time able intelligently to observe."

In his view, the one body beyond this earthly life that will not only equal but exceed the condition of our present body is the glorious body of the resurrection. When describing this result of God's expected intervention, Augustine is cautious and, much to his credit, he admits his ignorance, simply affirming that it will be "far superior" to our present body, whether it will be spiritual or corporeal.

Aristotle and Aquinas

Unlike Plato, Aristotle had seen that the soul and the body are intimately related, the soul being simply what he calls the "form"⁷ of the body. But, quite logically, this also led him to deny that the soul could continue to exist without its body.⁸ In this sense, he was a materialist.

As a Christian Aristotelian, Thomas Aquinas was thus facing a dilemma. He had to make the soul an exception, saying that it was a special kind of form that could temporarily exist without a body after death "until it is reunited with it in the general resurrection."⁹ Aquinas was aware that a soul without any external appearance (i.e., a body) was not normally a viable entity. The only way he could conceive of a permanent solution to the problem was through a return of the *physical* body at the end of time. Unlike Augustine, Thomas describes the qualities of the glorified body at the general resurrection in great detail, making every effort to eliminate any suggestion that it might have spiritual, i.e., non-material qualities.¹⁰ Aquinas' solution, which implies that the human soul could temporarily exist apart from a body, in full contradiction to his own principles, led to inextricable difficulties and severe criticism on the part of Duns Scotus.

René Descartes

With Descartes, of course, we reach the purest form of mind-body (or spirit-body)¹¹ dualism, and also the purest form of our problem: what does a spirit reduced to a pure "I think" concretely represent? I will return to that later. First, it is useful to turn to two relatively minor figures in the history of philosophy, Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, both 17th century Cambridge Platonists who were intimately involved in the spirit-body discussions of their time.¹²

According to Alexander Koyré, the well-known historian of ideas, it is often the lesser thinkers of a given period that highlight most clearly the influence of an idea on its environment.¹³ This is particularly true of More and Cudworth.

In *The Immortality of the Soul* (1659), Henry Moore opposes Cartesian dualism in a most straightforward and unusual way: he agrees with Descartes that, unlike matter, the spirit is simple and indivisible, yet he denies that it is unextended. Mijuskovic, the author of a very insightful study, summarizes the point as follows: “Both material objects and thinking substance are extended and the principle of distinction lies in that corporeal objects are materially divisible whereas spirits are not. More further contends that spirit can penetrate both other spirits and material things as well as initiate motion. In this fashion More: (a) repudiates the Cartesian identification of extension and matter, always in principle composite and divisible, which is opposed to mind as *unextended*; while (b) retaining the position that spirits are immaterial and hence indivisible and indestructible. ... [W]hat is not extended, according to More, is nonexistent. This principle is in obvious conflict with the basic Cartesian premise that thoughts and minds are unextended. ... [E]xtension (not essentially material in More) does not necessarily imply divisibility as it does for Descartes.”¹⁴

This insight, if it had been integrated into a coherent system of thought, would have represented a real revolution in the history of philosophy. More acknowledges the difference between the spiritual realm and the material realm by saying that spiritual beings do not consist of separable elements, but he denies that spirit is but an unextended point of thought or consciousness. In other words, he admits that spiritual beings do exist in time and space in their own way. He even offers a detailed explanation of the properties by which they differ from material substances (self-penetration, self-motion, self-contraction and dilatation, etc.).¹⁵

In this, he clearly displays the influence of Neoplatonism, including some of the early Church fathers (Origen¹⁶) and their theories about the different levels of reality. In the history of modern thought, however, he remains an isolated anomaly, except for his friend Ralph Cudworth, who essentially shares the same views.¹⁷ Lydia Gysi is certainly right when she notes that two strands coexist in Cudworth’s thought: a critical and an uncritical one (the same would apply to More).¹⁸ Precisely because they were *not* major thinkers, the two Cambridge men maintained within their body of thought insights that they could not really reconcile with the general *a priori* of the philosophical world they belonged to.

Both Koyré and Mijuskovic insist that, in spite of the strangeness of his views, More succeeded in “grasping the fundamental principle of the new ontology, the infinitization of space, which he asserted with an unflinching and fearless energy” thus preparing the way for the Newtonian worldview. After all, they say, More’s description of non-material reality also fits a number of intangible material phenomena, such as light, electricity and magnetism, that were the object of great interest at the time. However, they, and others as well, entirely dismiss More’s actual conclusions, which they say he was naïve enough to apply to actual spiritual beings, even ghosts.

Their line of criticism is beautifully reflected (or rather anticipated) by Hegel: “[In Cudworth’s main work] Platonic ideas expressed are often in a clumsy form and mingled with the Christian conceptions of God and angels - *all regarded as particular existent things* [my emphasis]. What in Plato is mythical, is here taken as reality in the form of existence; this is reasoned about just as we reason respecting a matter of ordinary fact, such as whether it is probable that the French seek to effect a landing in England, and if so, whether they will successfully accomplish it. The Christian intellectual world is dragged down to the form of ordinary actuality and consequently it is ruined.”¹⁹

Intermezzo: ghosts

By looking up the relevant entries for “spirit” in a few dictionaries and encyclopedias I have come up with the following result. For the *Random House Dictionary*, in substance, immaterial is equivalent to incorporeal. *Webster’s Dictionary* says essentially the same, but also describes spirit as “having the power to become visible at will.” Only the *New “Standard” Dictionary of the English Language* goes further.²⁰ Spirit: (3) “A disembodied soul regarded as manifested to the senses, often as visible or having some kind of **immaterial body**” [emphasis added].

This last definition expresses what popular belief has always grasped, at least as a vague notion, that the spirit, or soul, does have a form or shape of its own that can on occasion appear to us—in visions, as ghosts—in ways that are not bound by the laws of physical existence. This point has occasionally been acknowledged by philosophers, but with the implications suggested by the word “ghost,” that of an illusion or pseudo-reality. Those taking it seriously have shared the fate of Henry More.

May be surprisingly, in spite of all that was said above, the issue of ghosts was introduced by Plato himself: “[Souls that depart polluted] would be interspersed, I think, with a bodily element which had been worked into its substance by unceasing commerce and association with the body, and by long training. . . . and we must think of that element as a ponderous, heavy, earthy and visible substance; and the soul that carries it is weighed down and dragged back into the visible world; you know the stories about souls which, in their dread of the invisible that is called Hades, roam about tombs and burying-places, in the neighborhood of which, it is alleged, ghostly phantoms of souls have actually been seen – just the sort of wraiths that souls like that would produce, souls which are not pure when they are released but still retain some of that visible substance, which is just why they can be seen.”²¹ For Plato, this was not the original condition of the purified soul, which lives free from any bodily element in the realm of ideas. How the impure soul, by attracting lowly and “heavy” elements, can appear in a somewhat human shape that certainly cannot have been provided by these elements, he does not explain.²²

Ancient Greek philosophy is actually full of references to spirits, ghosts and demons.²³ Early Christian writers (including Augustine, as we have seen above) were understandably interested in the subject from a religious perspective. Mystics like

Hildegard von Bingen (a near contemporary of Aquinas) have given vivid accounts of their travels in the world of spirit, and so has Swedenborg at a later time. Mostly every religion includes references to the world beyond the senses. Parallel to that, there has been a growing “sub-culture” of spiritualism, psychic perceptions, etc., including attempts to demonstrate the reality of “paranormal” (spiritual) phenomena through scientific machinery. Movies and television series destined to a very large public show that the *notion* of such things as spirits, ghosts, and spiritual laws is perfectly acceptable to people at large.

Conceptually, however, there has never been a major school of thought that was able to incorporate an understanding of the world of spirit into a solid, systematic, and consistent framework – even though, as we have seen, a majority of thinkers, well into the 20th century, have tried to theoretically support their belief in God and the after-life.

In the end, the problem met by philosophers, whether they were Christians or materialists, has always been the same. It is the *identification of corporeality with physical materiality*. If corporeality is identified and defined in that way, it indeed cannot, with the limitations, constraints and laws attached to physical objects, be found in the world of spirit. That, of course, is essentially an assumption, due to the natural sciences background of our philosophical tradition, even where a religious perspective was superimposed upon it. It is this assumption that Henry More and Cudworth tried to shake off, unsuccessfully, because they lacked a convincing counter-proposal.²⁴

Immanuel Kant

Paradoxically, it is Kant who undertook what could have become a big step forward, at a time when the general mood was already far removed from that of medieval spirituality. His contemporary Swedenborg, a reputable scientist, had based his description of spiritual world not on any dogmatic assumption but on his actual experience, and he had made a clear distinction between the realm of God and that of finite spiritual beings. Kant expressed his ambivalent feelings in his early work, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics*, and eventually rejected the idea that it was possible to come to any positive conclusion on the existence of such beings, but in the process he acknowledged the issue and made it clear that he was personally inclined to admit the reality of the spiritual realm.²⁵

Kant’s statement in his first Critique sounds rather definitive: “A substance which is permanently present in space, yet without filling it... or a peculiar fundamental power of the mind of intuiting the future by anticipation (instead of merely inferring from past and present events), or, finally, a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, however distant they may be—these are conceptions the possibility of which has no ground to rest upon.”²⁶

Nevertheless, there is a considerable difference with most thinkers mentioned above. Kant simply applies his critical method and finds no ground to justify any

statement on facts that do not fit into his categories of space-time, even though he was inclined otherwise. Unlike his predecessors and many of his successors, Kant did not say that substantial, corporeal beings and events in the spiritual dimension are *per se* an absurdity and cannot exist. He merely said that there was no basis in his system for saying anything about the matter. Because he could not accept spiritual phenomena as a different type of sense data without meeting insuperable difficulties, and because he did not accept the notion of a direct intuition not related to the senses (comparable to intellectual intuition), that conclusion was inevitable. The spiritual dimension was rejected into the realm of faith where, however, it found itself in good company: that of God, immortality, and the moral question.

Philosophy did not stop with Kant. But, after his critiques, the conceptual consideration of spiritual reality became more remote. The unsolved issues of earlier western philosophy have remained as a burden. They certainly do not prevent experimental dealings with the world of spirit nor the possible elaboration of perfectly correct descriptions of its laws. But they prevent the formation of a coherent worldview that includes the spiritual realm.

2. Another look at mind-body dualism

a) The types of *sungsang-hyungsang* relationships

Those present here at this symposium are most probably familiar with Unification Thought's concepts of *sungsang* and *hyungsang*, usually translated as "internal character" and "external form" respectively. These concepts have briefly been introduced above. Their application to the spirit-body question is more complex than it may seem at first. Unification Thought makes the distinction between four types of *sungsang-hyungsang* relationships within human beings:²⁷

1. *spirit mind / spirit body*
2. *spirit person / physical person*
3. *mind / body*
4. *spirit mind / physical mind*

At this point, I feel compelled to repeat what conductor Eugene Ormandy reportedly once said to the musicians of the Philadelphia Orchestra: "I don't want to confuse you more than absolutely necessary." It is not necessary for our purpose here to discuss each one of these aspects.

The key point for our topic is that there is not only a relationship where the spirit mind forms an impalpable "internal character" and the physical body a visible, extended "external form." Both our physical being and our spiritual being exist as a *sungsang-hyungsang* pair. On the physical or material plane, we have a physical body, but that body also has an internal governing principle called the "physical mind" similar to the animal instinct. In the spiritual dimension, we not only have a "spirit mind" (usually

referred to as the soul or simply spirit); that spirit mind also has an external form, i.e., a “spirit body.”

Western dualism, I would suggest, really stems from the fact that only the two extremes have generally been considered. The physical being is merely considered as a body, an amount of matter (which, incidentally, has made a proper definition of material reality as difficult as that of spiritual reality).²⁸ The spirit, on the other hand, has generally been considered as a mere “spirit mind” devoid of any corporality, as we have shown above. Aristotle forms an (admittedly important) exception in that he clearly saw the reciprocal relationship between form and potentiality (matter) in existing beings. But he did not make the step of applying this distinction to non-material entities that he ignored.

If we do take that step, we will have two viable entities: a physical being (mind and body) and a spirit being (mind and body). The relationship between the two is no longer the impossible relationship that would exist between a mind that is only mind (or soul, or spirit in the sense of spirit mind), and a physical body that is only matter, two entities that are really extraneous to each other.

b) Unification Thought and mind-body dualism

The claim of Unification Thought is that it overcomes the problem of philosophical dualism because in its Theory of the Original Image, the Original Being (God) is seen as possessing within himself the two complementary attributes of *sungsang* and *hyungsang*. Spirit, which derives from the former, and body, which derives from the latter, have a common source and are not ultimately heterogeneous. Nevertheless, if the spirit as pure mind and the body as pure matter were to face each other as such, it would be hard to see how they could relate at all. This would quite exactly be the situation we have in Descartes’ system.

Despite differences, accounts about spirit world have in common that they regularly present the external, or bodily appearance of spirit as following the very same laws as those of the mind. In Unification Thought terminology, we would say that the *hyungsang* part of the spirit (the spirit body) is the external appearance of the *sungsang* part (the spirit mind), and thus has its properties.

Conclusion

The reason, sometimes referred to explicitly, why that scenario has been dismissed is that the idea of a spiritual human body living without the constraints and limitations of earthly reality seems to be wishful thinking and utterly unrealistic, while attributing this type of freedom to a pure mind merely extrapolates on our personal experience.

My main point is that, in spite of the questions it does raise, that position is to the contrary the only one that makes logical sense once one has chosen the view of idealism,

acknowledging the transcendence of spirit over matter. If that step is not taken, the materialist position, with all its flaws, is more consistent after all. Positing the eternal existence of the human mind apart from any corporal existence leads to a literal aporia.

Taking the position I suggest may lead to another series of excruciatingly difficult problems, in particular the need to conceptually justify the specific laws of spiritual existence (an entirely different application of time and space), but it is a task that philosophical inquiry has to face and one, I believe, that is worth the investment.

¹ Unification Thought Symposium, Seoul, Korea, February 15-16, 2002.

² Prolegomena to a Philosophical Inquiry into the Spirit World. *Journal of Unification Studies*, IV: 17-32, 2001-2002.

³ Ben Lazare Mijuskovic, *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments. The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant: A Study in the History of an Argument*. International Archives of the History of ideas, Series Minor 13 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 1 ff.

⁴ First used in the *Phaedo* 78b ff.

⁵ Robert J. O'Connell, *The Origin of the Soul in St. Augustine's Later Works* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1987), p. 238, passim.

⁶ St. Augustine, *A Treatise on the Soul and its Origin* (419 AD).
www.newadvent.org/fathers/1508.htm

⁷ "Form" is another potentially misleading expression. For Aristotle, it means the intangible, form-giving element of things, matter being their formless potentiality. But form can mean quite exactly the opposite, namely the visible form or shape of things. Thus, Unification Thought's *sungsang* and *hyungsang* mean "internal character" and "external form" respectively. This point is explained more clearly in *Essentials of Unification Thought: The Head-Wing Thought* (Tokyo: Unification Thought Institute, 1992), p. 7.

⁸ Thus, quite logically, Aristotle opposed the belief in reincarnation found in Plato. In *Plato on Immortality* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965), Robert Lee Patterson scoffs at Aristotle for taking that position: "What is amazing about Aristotle's position is the curiously materialistic fashion in which he conceives of the soul, as though it possessed dimension and shape so that, like a key which will fit into the lock of only one locker in a locker-room, it can be united only to a single body. We can image how Plato would have laughed at so bizarre a conception." From the perspective of Unification Thought and, in my opinion, common sense, this is in fact perfectly sound reasoning.

⁹ Richard Swinburne, "Nature and Immortality of the Soul," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1998), vol. 9, p. 45. This excellent article has proven generally useful in this discussion. Cf. Frederick Coplestone, *Thomas Aquinas* (London: Search Press, 1976), pp. 156-198.

¹⁰ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), Vol. II. Supplement to the Third Part, e.g., pp. 975-976: the resurrected body is *not* a subtle, immaterial, spiritual body; p. 977: “It cannot be maintained that a glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, is able to be in the same place with another body”; p. 986: Can the glorified body move instantaneously? “But this will not hold, because the glorified body will never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature, just as it will never cease to be a body.”

¹¹ Expressions such as Spirit, soul, and mind represent a vexing terminological problem. Though they have often been used with specific and distinct definitions, both in the various religious traditions and in the various philosophical systems, the meanings used are often contradictory, even within a given system or tradition. Additionally, French and German, two languages in which a number of key philosophical contributions to the topic were written, have no separate word for mind. In Latin, Descartes uses “mens” (the equivalent of mind), while in French he uses “âme” (soul) or “esprit” (spirit). The implications of these terminological variations and the range of meaning covered by each term are more important than one might think at first. They will be the topic of a further article. Here, I have generally used “spirit” with the meaning of a non-material entity that can exist apart from the physical body.

¹² The Cambridge Platonists are a group of 17th century British philosopher who attempted to reconcile the empiricism of their British contemporaries and the scientific mind of the time with the idealistic principles of Platonism.

¹³ Alexandre Koyré, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 49 (Note 72), referring to Lovejoy’s *The Great Chain of Being*.

¹⁴ Ben Lazare Mijuskovic, *ibid.*, pp. 32-33. Note that Santayana’s description of the realm of being is strikingly similar to More’s description of spirits, except that it applies to a purely abstract realm: “Existence exists by virtue of oppositions in the place, time, and exclusive characters of particulars: being has being by virtue of its universal identity. This is true of the being of each individual essence; and it is true preeminently of pure Being. Its identity is omnipresent and internal everywhere... it makes all times simultaneous; and by excluding change makes existence, from its point of view, inconceivable.” George Santayana, *The Realm of Essence, Book First of Realms of Being* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974 [1928]), pp. 48-49.

¹⁵ Henry More, *Antidote against Atheism*, book I cap. IV, 3, p. 15. Quoted in: Alexandre Koyré, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 127-129.

¹⁶ Cf. Karl Rahner, *Le Début d’une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origène*, *Revue d’ascétique et de mystique* XIII (April 1932), 113-45. English translation: *Theological Investigations* XVI (London, 1979), 81-103.

¹⁷ Ralph Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1978) [Original published in 1678], vol. 1, p. XIV (not numbered) and vol. 2, pp. 794-816.

¹⁸ Lydia Gysi (Mother Maria), *Platonism and Cartesianism in the Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth* (Bern: Herbert Lang, 1966), p. 8.

¹⁹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 4. Cudworth. Clarke. Wollaston. Available at:
<http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/texts/Hegel%20-%20Hist%20Phil/cudworth.htm>

²⁰ Funk and Wagnalls, New York, 1947.

²¹ *Plato's Phaedo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 89.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 184: "And those of their number who have attained full purity through philosophy live for evermore without any bodies at all, and attain to habitations even fairer than those others; but the nature of these it would not be easy to reveal, even were time enough now left me."

Note 1: Although what we call 'death' is, broadly speaking, ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγὴ (64C, separated from the body), yet all souls save those purified by philosophy 'drag something of the body with them' after death (80E ff., 82B-C); but we should think of this rather as a quality or taint of the soul than as actual bodily substance.

²³ Cf., for instance, J. Den Boeft, *Calcidius on Demons* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977).

²⁴ They have not remained totally isolated, however. The great thinker Leibniz has said similar things (*New Essays*, section 6) : "[The soul] keeps always, even in death, an organized body, a part of the preceding, although what it keeps is always subject to insensible dissipation and to reparation, and indeed to undergoing in a certain time a great change."

²⁵ Kant was convinced of Swedenborg's genuine ability to have prophetic insights by perceiving things beyond the boundaries of physical space-time. Swedenborg had given a detailed description of a fire that had just broken out 50 miles away. Kant: "[This] occurrence appears to me to have the greatest weight of proof, and to place the assertion respecting Swedenborg's extraordinary gift beyond all possibility of doubt," in Frank Sewall, Preface, and Appendices to *Dreams*, p. 158. "I cannot help having a slight inclination for things of this kind [spiritual visions], and indeed, as regards their reasonableness, I cannot help cherishing an opinion that there is some validity in these experiences in spite of all the absurdities involved in the stories about them," Kant's April 8, 1766 letter to Mendelssohn, quoted in Frank Sewall, Preface, and Appendices to *Dreams*, p. 162. Finally: "Neither the possibility nor the impossibility of this kind of thing can be proved, and if someone attacked Swedenborg's dreams as impossible, I should undertake to defend them," in Gabriele Rabel, *Kant* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p.74. These and other references, as well as an interesting discussion can be found in: Stephen Palmquist, "Kant's Critique of Mysticism: (1) The Critical Dreams," in *Philosophy & Theology* 3:4 (Summer 1989), pp.355-383.

²⁶ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1950), p. 168; A 222-223, B 270.

²⁷ *Essentials of Unification Thought: The Head-Wing Thought* (Tokyo: Unification Thought Institute, 1992), p. 93.

²⁸ Cf. Santayana, *The Realm of Essence*, p. 169. "Curiously ... [m]atter, though so much nearer and dearer to the heart of mankind, is even harder to define [than the realm of essence] and to situate from a psychological point of view." Henri Bergson has also rightly observed that the materialist attempt to reduce all phenomena to physical reality in the end amounts to attributing to

that physical reality quasi-supernatural qualities. Henri Bergson, *Matière et Mémoire. Essai sur la relation du corps à l'Esprit* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1929 [1896]).